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Abstract
The problem of obtaining secret commitments from multiple parties and revealing them after a certain
time is useful for sealed-bid auctions, games, and other applications. Existing solutions, dating back to
Rivest, Shamir and Wagner, either do not scale or rely on synchrony for the commitment phase and trust
of t/n parties.
We formalize the problem of implementing such commitments with a probabilistic delay and without
the aforementioned assumptions as Multi-Party Timed Commitments (MPTC) and present a solution –
the Time-Capsule protocol. Like previous approaches, Time Capsule forms a puzzle whose solution
reveals the committed values. But unlike previous solutions, no party has an advantage in solving the
puzzle, and individual commitments cannot be revealed before the entire set is committed.
A particular application of MPTC realizes an advancement in the study of decentralized systems. The
state of the art in decentralized systems is manifested in blockchain systems that utilize Proof of Work to
achieve censorship resistance. However, they are still vulnerable to frontrunning, an issue that is plaguing
operational systems. By adapting Time Capsule, we allow it to be used for Proof of Work, preventing
frontrunning by system operators and tuning the puzzle difficulty using the blockchain mechanism.
1 Introduction
Various applications like auctions [84, 76, 26], exchanges [18, 92, 62, 56] and games [66, 19] require multiple
users to each commit to a value. Critically, each user should learn nothing about the other commitments
before making her own. The archetypal example [29, 76, 26] is an auction. In a second-price auction, where
the top bidder wins and pays the second highest price, if the last bidder saw the other bids, she could propose
a price negligibly smaller than the highest bid and maximize the seller’s profit at the expense of the top
bidder. This is called frontrunning.
To prevent frontrunning, participants can use a trusted third party (TTP) to collect all commitments
and publish them only after all participants have committed. But if the third party was compromised and
collaborated with one of the participants, they could trivially perform frontrunning. Roughly, the question
we address is how to design a protocol that doesn’t use a TTP and allows a large number of participants to
commit to values such that no one can perform frontrunning.
Previous work has addressed various variants of this theme, but none solves the problem at hand. The
TTP can be replaced by a distributed system [84, 15]; but the system is vulnerable to frontrunning if enough
elements of the distributed system are compromised. Serial time-lock puzzles [86, 29] allow an encrypter to
time-lock a single message such that decryption requires a long serial computation; but this approach does
not scale to many participants. Other approaches require additional assumptions like trusted hardware [18]
or synchrony at the commitment phase [62].
In this paper we introduce the Multi-Party Timed Commitments (MPTC ) problem. A set of N users
complete an interactive commit protocol with a single coordinator to form an arbitrary order of commitments
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on messages. Once done, the coordinator reveals the list of messages within a bounded expected time,
independent of the number of users N . Any third-party can verify the messages and that their order
matches the commitments.
A solution should be secure in face of a static PPT adversary that can compromise the coordinator and all
participants but one honest party and under the Discrete Logarithm (DL) and Random Oracle assumptions
and an assumption on the total computational power of the parties. Specifically, it should be sound, that
is, the adversary cannot reveal a message that was not committed. It should also be frontrunning-resistant,
that is, the adversary cannot affect the output based on an honest party’s message. It should provide
time-lock, that is, the time it takes to reveal the commitments is a predefined parameter, meaning that an
adversary cannot abort the protocol based on committed messages’ content before that time. A solution
should also provide an ensured output guarantee, that is, a party that invests her resources in order to reveal
the messages is guaranteed to succeed and output the original messages.
We present the Time-Capsule protocol that solves the MPTC problem. In Time Capsule the parties
first jointly choose a random public ElGamal [46] moderately-hard encryption key [43, 86, 10]. Due to the
ElGamal key-generation scheme, for each randomly chosen public key there exists a matching private key,
but at this stage no entity in the system knows it. The parties subsequently all commit to the order of their
encrypted messages, locking down the order without relying on synchrony assumptions. Only once each
party received all its peers’ commitments, does it send its ciphertext. To simplify the protocol, we employ
an untrusted coordinator, which is responsible to coordinate protocol progress and aggregate data. Given
all ciphertexts, the coordinator decrypts all messages by solving a DL puzzle whose solution is the private
key.
The time to reveal the commitments is therefore determined by the parallel computational power available
to the coordinator. The estimated time to solve DL should be calculated considering the best known
algorithm. A coordinator could in principle perform a precomputation (e.g., with Index calculus [58]) to
reduce her decryption time. In order to improve the accuracy of time estimation, we propose a simple
modification to the DL problem definition. We start with the observation that precomputation in known
efficient solutions to the DL problem [4, 3] apply only to a single group and generator. We formalize this
as an assumption that precomputation can only reduce effort for a polynomial set of groups. Based on
this assumption we define the Precomputation-Resistant Discrete Logarithm (PCR-DL) problem and show
it is as hard as a DL problem without precomputation. PCR-DL may thus be of independent interest for
any application that depends on the hardness of the DL problem in Z∗p for its security, e.g., for ElGamal
encryption and signature, Diffie Hellman key exchange and Schnorr signature, since using PCR-DL instead
of traditional DL reduces the probability to perform a precomputation attack on these schemes and reveal
the private key of a party to be negligible.
Finally, we show how Time Capsule can be adapted to achieve an advancement in the study of Proof of
Work (PoW ) [43, 57] permissionless protocols. Dwork and Naor [43] and followup work presented PoW as
a mechanism to increase the cost of spam [2, 42, 10] and denial-of-service attacks [9, 96]. The mechanism
requires principals to prove they expended resources as a precondition to preforming actions like sending a
message or an email. This imposes a minor cost on well-behaved users, but a high cost on an attacker who
must solve numerous puzzles. Therefore, it establishes security in systems that do not require permission
for entry. PoW is implemented as a cryptographic puzzle that is quick to generate and verify but requires a
tunable amount of resources to solve.
Aspnes et al. [8] took the next step with a protocol that utilizes PoW to ensures participants in a classical
consensus protocol cannot masquerade as multiple nodes in a so-called Sybil attack. Nakamoto [75] made
this approach practical by introducing the Bitcoin Blockchain PoW-oriented consensus protocol, including an
organic mechanism for tuning the PoW difficulty, and an internal currency to incentivize participation. The
blockchain operators, called miners, create data structures called blocks that contain user operations called
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transactions. Each block must contain a valid proof of work, and rewards its creator with cryptocurrency
tokens. The blockchain protocol was adopted in many so-called cryptocurrencies [75, 34, 69, 31] to achieve
censorship-resistance. These cryptocurrencies facilitate payments among users, as well as so-called smart
contracts that enable elaborate applications like decentralized exchanges [48, 56, 85, 95], auctions [50, 22,
51] and loans [1, 87]. The underlying blockchain mechanism ensures censorship-resistance, i.e., no system
operator can block user actions. Still, existing blockchains are vulnerable to frontrunning: each user’s
transactions are public, allowing others, particularly the system operators, to place their own transactions
in advance or rearrange the order of transactions. This has become a practical concern in operational
systems [39, 32].
To overcome this we present Capsule Chain, a frontrunning-resistant blockchain protocol, with a different
user-miner communication model and a new PoW component. Capsule Chain uses a variant of Time Capsule
to hide the contents of the transactions until they are placed in the blockchain. The decryption of the
transactions serves as a PoW mechanism for the blockchain, and utilizes it as a practical way to tune the
decryption hardness. The challenge is that in Time Capsule the puzzle is deterministically determined by
the users. For MPTC this is not a problem – it is in the users’ interest to choose a random puzzle each time.
For PoW this is not sufficient, as users could collaborate to repeatedly solve the same puzzle and win the
blockchain rewards. Therefore, Capsule Chain puzzles are based on the blockchain structure as well as the
content of the block’s transactions. We show that this change achieves the requirements for PoW, as well as
the MPTC definition apart from ensured output, which can be enforced through external means.
In summary, our main contributions are as follows. 1. Formalization of the MPTC problem (§3), 2. pre-
sentation of the Time-Capsule algorithm (§4), 3. proof that Time Capsule solves MPTC (§5), 4. formalization
of precomputation limitation assumption (PCR-DL) and introduction of PCR-DL puzzles (§6), 5. presen-
tation of Capsule Chain, a frontrunning-resistant blockchain (§7), and 6. proof that Capsule Chain solves
MPTC, PCR-DL and provides blockchain PoW requirements (§7.3).
2 Related Work
Puzzles Several works solve the problem of committing to a value that will be revealed at a certain time
in the future [86, 29, 15] but these solutions does not scale to a large set of commitments.
Other works scale to multiple commitments [84, 76] but require trust in t out of n parties.
Homomorphic time-lock puzzles [70] is an algorithm to compute a function over a set of time-locked
puzzles. The algorithm constructs a new time-locked puzzle from all of them; the solution to the constructed
puzzle is the output of the function. Both Time Capsule and homomorphic time-lock puzzles offer a so-
lution for hiding a set of secrets for a period of time, while a certain functionality is finalized. However,
Homomorphic time-lock puzzles’ values and solutions are restricted to a finite size, thus they do not scale
to reveal a large list of commitments. Moreover, Homomorphic time-lock puzzles assumes synchrony for the
commitment phase.
Verifiable Delay Function (VDF) VDF [27, 78, 97, 28] is a function that requires a large number of
sequential computations to evaluate and whose output can be verified efficiently. This asymmetry is similar
to the puzzle we use in Time Capsule. However, in general, VDFs provide only time delay and do not hide
any secrets during this delay and thus are not useful for MPTC. As opposed to VDF, Time-Capsule puzzle
is not sequential; it is an interesting question whether it has a serial alternative.
MPC and ZKP Multi-party computation (MPC) protocols [98, 53, 36] enable a set of un-trusting parties
to compute a function of their private inputs, learning only the result of a function and nothing else about
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the inputs.
Unlike MPC, MPTC requires that the inputs remain private only for a limited time. Typical practical
MPC solutions, for example [25, 26, 40, 16], are designed for a specific application or requirement, such as
semi-honest parties, t out of n trusted parties or a small number of participant, whereas Time Capsule is a
general protocol for any application and any number of participants in a trustless environment.
Some MPC applications, such as auctions and coin tossing, that require the inputs to stay private only
until the set of inputs is finalized, can be solved by Time Capsule.
Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) [24, 17, 23, 54] allow to prove what is the output of a specific function,
without revealing anything else about the input. ZKP does not solve MPTC, which requires to reveal all
commitments after a time delay.
Permissionless Blockchains We proceed to discuss blockchain work related to Capsule Chain.
Many works [100, 94, 52, 63, 20, 12, 60, 49] address the wastefullness of blockchain PoW. The Cap-
sule Chain PoW puzzle provides a timely decryption service, thus being less wasteful than common PoW
computation.
Privacy coins [88, 73, 99, 41, 74] are blockchains that hide the contents of transactions. These blockchains
do not solve MPTC because their privacy does not allow to run on-chain smart contracts, which requires
the participating parties to compute the smart contract’s result for each input and know its value.
Several works implement frontrunning-resistant auctions, exchanges and general applications over smart
contracts [7, 18, 62, 65, 50, 22, 51, 32, 33]. They rely on stronger assumptions than in MPTC, such as
penalties, trusted execution environment, trust in an honest majority or in t out of n parties.
Blockchain Applications Analyses of frontrunning in cryptocurrency blockchains [47, 39] report a sizable
economy of bots profiting from frontrunning and arbitrage in auctions and Decentralized exchanges (DEXes).
Decentralized Finance (DeFi) [89] is a variety of decentralized financial services and DEXes [56, 95, 13, 85, 48],
typically implemented with Ethereum smart contracts. These services operate in a non-custodial manner,
without a trusted third party holding the users’ funds; they are thus protected from a malicious service
provider who tries to steal the users’ funds. However, these services are susceptible to frontrunning and
would benefit from a frontrunning-resistant blockchain.
Second Layer Blockchain Applications Several works use a blockchain to enforce fairness of games
and contracts [67, 66, 5, 6, 19]. They use a blockchain as a trusted party to collect collateral from the users
and use it as penalty in case they misbehave. However, blockchains are operated by independent nodes
which can be bribed [71, 59] to violate the expected behavior, making them unreliable. Capsule Chain does
not assume trusted third party.
Second-tier protocols [82, 81, 44, 45, 68] allow a set of parties to place collateral on a blockchain, allowing
any of them to terminate the protocol by placing a transaction on the blockchain that redistributes the
amount in the collaterals. If the terminator acts maliciously, another party can dispute its transaction
within a long time period. The schemes are secure over a censorship-resistant blockchain and do not require
frontrunning-resistance.
3 MPTC Model
3.1 Structure and Assumptions
The system comprises a set of N participants P = {P1, P2, ...., PN} and a coordinator. Each participants Pi
has a secret key Ski and access to a public key infrastructure (PKI) service that maintains the matching pub-
4
PN . . . P1 Coordinator
...
output
τ
commit
reveal
Figure 1: MPTC Diagram
lic keys {Pk1, ..., PkN}. All parties can exchange messages via reliable channels. The system is parametrized
by two security parameters λm and λh, for computationally moderate and computationally hard problems,
respectively. Each participant has a private memory of size polynomial in λm and a known parallel compu-
tational power. A static adversary, PPT in λh, can compromise the coordinator and all parties except for
one.
Cryptographic assumptions We assume that the DL assumption over the multiplicative group modulo p
holds: Let p be a safe prime of size λm bits. Let G be the multiplicative group modulo p generated by g ∈ G.
Let a be chosen uniformy at random a
R
←− Z∗P . Given (G, p, g, g
a), a PPT adversary’s probability of finding
a is negligible in λm. Given a time τ , we can calculate the matching λm value such that the DL puzzle
with λm as security parameter will take an expected mean time τ to solve. The participants have a difficulty
table that maps each λm value to a prime number p and a generator g.
We also define and assume the Multi-DL assumption as follows:
Assumption 1 (Multi-DL assumption). Let k be a number polynomial in λm. For any PPT adversary A,
solving one out of k random DL puzzles, the advantage over solving a single DL puzzle is negligible.
We assume a secure signature scheme with operations sign and verifySig. This scheme guarantees a
signature forgery probability εsig-forgery, which is negligible in λh. Each party has access to a hash function,
modeled as a random oracle hash : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λh. The probability to find the pre-image of the hash
is εpre-image and the probability of a hash collision is εhash collision Participants can use a Merkle tree [72]
structure, which guarantees a negligible root collision probability εMT collision.
Additionally, there is a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) that provides a func-
tion PRNG(seed, first bit, bit count) and returns bit count bits, starting from first bit of the pseudo ran-
dom bits generated from the randomness seed. The PRNG guarantees that a polynomial length output is
computationally indistinguishable from a random output with an advantage εPRNG, negligible in λh. This
assumption can be realized, e.g., with the Blum-Micali n-wise sequential composition [30]. Let G be a secure
PRG that holds the advantage εPRG, negligible in λh. The Blum-Micali n-wise sequential composition G
′
expands G’s output from t+ l bits to n× t+ l bits and is also a secure PRG with the following advantage:
PRGadv[A, G′] = n ∗ PRGadv[A, G] = n ∗ εPRG,
which is negligible for a polynomial number of iterations n. A practical choice for PRNG is ChaCha [21].
3.2 Goal
A protocol S solving the MPTC comprises three elements: a commit protocol, a reveal function and a verify
function. It proceeds in two phases: commit and reveal (Figure 1).
In the commit phase, each participant Pi in P chooses a message m and runs an interactive protocol with
the coordinator to commit this message and agree on a list of message commitments. In the reveal phase, the
coordinator runs reveal(·), which proceeds for a random time with mean value τ and then outputs a list Lm
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of tuples (m, i) and a proof proof. Anyone can verify that the output is correct using the function verify(Lm,
proof ), which returns the value TRUE if and only if Lm matches the messages and order confirmed in the
commit phase. If verify(Lm, proof ) = TRUE, we say that (Lm, proof ) is valid. We denote the tuple (m, i)
by mi.
We formalize the MPTC security as the following properties:
Soundness The coordinator outputs mi only if the participant Pi committed to m in the commit phase.
We formally define this property using the ΓSSound game played between a challenger that represents the
participants and an adversary that represents the coordinator. We denote a multiset by {{·}} and multiset
subtraction by \.
• The adversary chooses a multiset of messages {{m1, ....,mk}}, k is polynomial in λh;
• the challenger and adversary run the commit protocol: The challenger has k different identi-
ties Pchallenger = {P1, .., Pk}; for each message mj ∈ {{m1, ....,mk}}, Pj commits mj .
• The adversary outputs (Lm, proof).
The adversary wins the ΓSSound game if she outputs a valid output such that {{m
j
i ∈ Lm|Pj ∈
Pchallenger}}\{{m11, ....,m
k
k}} 6= ∅. In other words, the output contains a message as if it was commit-
ted by the challenger, even though it was not. We denote the event that the adversary wins by WSSound. We
define the advantage in this game by Soundadv[λh,A] , Pr[WSSound].
Definition 1 (Soundness). A protocol S provides Soundness if for any PPT adversary A playing the ΓSSound
game, Soundadv[λh,A] is negligible in λh.
Frontrunning-resistance FR-resistance means that an adversary cannot change the content of its output
based on the content of messages generated by other parties. Specifically, she cannot add (or equivalently,
remove) a specific message to the list or change the order of the list. We formalize these two requirements
using two games, which we describe below using the following template:
• The adversary chooses three different messages mA,m0,m1 and sends m0 and m1 to the challenger;
• the challenger chooses b
R
←− {0, 1};
• the challenger and adversary run the commit protocol: The challenger, as particiant Pi, commits a
message mb and the adversary commits k messages of her choice, where k is polynomial in λh.
• The adversary outputs (Lm, proof).
In the first game, the Frontrunning Message Choosing (FMC ) game, the adversary wants a message to
appear depending on the choice of the challenger. The adversary wins if the output is valid and (1) if b = 0,
then one of the messages in Lm is mA or (2) if b = 1, then none of the messages in Lm is mA. We denote
the event that the adversary wins by WSFMC. Obviously, the adversary can win the game with probability
1/2 by choosing whether to commit mA uniformly at random. We define the advantage of an adversary A
in this game by FMCadv[λm, λh,A] , |Pr[WSFMC]− 1/2|.
In the second game, the Frontrunning Order choosing (FOC ) game, the adversary’s goal is to order the
messages according to the choice of the challenger. The adversary wins the game if the output is valid,
only one of the messages m0 or m1 appears in Lm and (1) if b = 0, then mA appears before m
i
0 in Lm or
(2) if b = 1, then mA appears after m
i
1. We denote the event that the adversary wins by W
S
FOC. Again,
the adversary can win the game with probability 1/2 if the order of the list is set uniformly at random. We
define the advantage of adversary A in this game by FOCadv[λm, λh,A] , |Pr[WSFOC]− 1/2|.
With these two games we can define FR-resistance.
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Definition 2 (FR-Resistance). A protocol S provides FR-resistance if for any PPT adversary A playing
either ΓSFMC or Γ
S
FOC, the advantages FMCadv[λm, λh,A] and FOCadv[λm, λh,A] respectively, are negligible
in λh.
Time-Lock If at least one participant follows the protocol, the time it takes to reveal a single commitment
committed by a participant that follows the protocol has a mean value of τ . The reveal delay time can start
at the beginning of the commit phase, thus the mean reveal time is τ . This requirement applies for each
commitment submitted by a participant that is following the protocol.
Definition 3 (Time-Lock). Let τ be a parameter defined in time units. For a run of the protocol, we mark
the beginning of the commit phase by time 0 and the time that the commitment of participant Pi is revealed
by tireveal. We denote the set of participants following the protocol by PH ∈ P . If |PH | ≥ 1 then the mean
value of tjreveal where Pj ∈ PH is at least τ .
Note that the mean reveal time τ is independent of the number of participants N .
Ensured Output If the coordinator is following the protocol then she’s guaranteed to be able to produce
a valid output after the declared time delay.
Definition 4 (Ensured Output). Once the commit phase has ended, a coordinator that is following the
protocol will output a valid output after mean time τ .
MPTC Using these properties we define the MPTC problem.
Definition 5 (MPTC). A tuple ( commit, reveal, verify) of a commit protocol S commit, a reveal function
reveal and a verify function verify that provides Soundness, FR-Resistance, Time-Lock and Ensured Output
solves MPTC.
4 Time Capsule Algorithm
We present Time Capsule, an algorithm that solves the MPTC problem. The crux of the approach is as
follows. The parties jointly form a moderate-difficulty public encryption key, without anyone in the system
knowing the matching secret key. Each party encrypts its message and sends it to the coordinator. The
coordinator uses a brute-force search to decrypt the messages, which succeeds after a predictable time and
allows her to publish the messages. To prevent attacks where the coordinator manages by luck to find the
secret key before the commitment phase is done, the parties actually start by committing to their encrypted
messages. We proceed to describe the commit protocol and reveal and verify algorithms.
Commit The commit protocol between each participant Pi and the coordinator proceeds as follows (Figure
2). Each participant chooses a random nonce (line p1) and sends it to the coordinator. The coordinator
aggregates the nonces in a Merkle tree Tseed (c1). The root of the tree will serve as a random seed (c3). The
coordinator sends seed to each participant as well as a Merkle proof (c2) that her nonce is included in the
tree for her to verify (p2). In our pseudo code, assert means that if the check fails, the users aborts.
Next, each participant calculates an ElGamal encryption public key for the Time-Lock PkTL from the
seed (p3). The public key for ElGamal encryption has three parameters: a prime number p, a generator g
of the group Z∗p and a member b of the group Z
∗
p .
We need to be able to tune the puzzle’s difficulty according to the computation power in the network
to reach the delay target. We use the group size |Z∗P | = |p − 1| to adjust the difficulty of the puzzle. This
means that for each difficulty we choose a different prime number for the puzzle.
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The public key calculation is done using the deterministic function GenPuz(λ, seed) (Algorithm 1). The
function takes a security parameter λm and randomness seed. First, it selects a safe prime p and a generator g
from the difficulty table (line 2).
Then it chooses the group member b with iteration sampling as follows. It expands the seed to a longer
pseudo random bit stream by using the PRNG. It constructs a candidate bcandidate from the pseudo random
bits and checks whether it is in the group Z∗P ; this is repeated until a valid candidate is found (lines 3-7).
The function returns the three values PkTL ← (p, g, b).
Getting back to the commit protocol (Figure 2), now that the participant has calculated PkTL, she
chooses a random value ri (p4), concatenates the messagemi and ri and encrypts it using ElGamal encrytion
(p5). She computes a hash of the encrypted value (p6). She sends the hash output and her index i to the
coordinator. The coordinator creates a list LH (c4, c5) of all the values she received from the participants,
these are the commitments of the encrypted messages. She sends the list to all of the participants.
Each participant verifies that her commitment appears once in LH (p7), otherwise she aborts. She then
signs the list and seed with her secret key Ski (p8) and sends the signature along with the encrypted message,
Cmi , and her index i to the coordinator. The coordinator verifies that the signature is valid (c6) and that
Cmi matches the previously received commitment (c8) in order to guarantee the validity of the output,
otherwise she aborts.
Once the coordinator collected all encrypted messages and signatures (c9, c10), the commit phase is done.
Reveal Once the coordinator has received the signatures from all participants, she can proceed to reveal
the commitments by finding the decryption key SkTL corresponding to PkTL. She does that by searching
for a ∈ Z∗P such that b = g
a mod p, namely solving an instance of the DL problem. The coordinator uses
an efficient algorithm of her choice to solve the discrete logarithm problem [80, 79, 58, 38] and the difficulty
table is tuned for such an efficient algorithm. But to make things concrete we consider for example a na¨ıve
linear search implementation (Algorithm 4).
Once the coordinator finds SkTL, the puzzle solution, she decrypts the commitments and outputs them
along with the key SkTL, the signature list Ls and the seed (Algorithm 2).
Verify Any participant can validate the coordinator’s output with the function VerifyOutput(·) (Algo-
rithm 3). First, the participant verifies that SkTL matches PkTL. Next, she uses the encryption key PkTL
to encrypt each message and generates the list of hashes of the encrypted messages. And finally, she verifies
that each signature matches this list and seed, using the PKI.
Implementation variations Note that in Time Capsule, the order of the committed messages’ list is set
in the commit protocol (c5). However, there are other options. The order can be determined at an earlier
stage, according to the order of nonces in the merkle tree (c1); it can also be determined later, after the
revel phase, by permuting the list according to a random seed constructed from the revealed messages.
Another interesting question is whether a puzzle alternative can work in EC groups where different
difficulty choices imply different curve choices. We leave that for future work.
5 Correctness
We prove that Time Capsule solves MPTC by proving that it achieves Soundness (§5.1), FR-resistance (§5.2),
Time-Lock (§5.3) and Ensured Output (§5.4) .
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Pi Coordinator
p1: noncei
R
←− {0, 1}λh
Encrypt and Commit
p2: assert(verifyMP(seed,MPi,noncei))
p3: PkTL ← GenPuz(λm, seed)
p4: ri
R
←− {0, 1}λh
p5: Cmi ← encPkTL(mi‖ri)
p6: HCmi ← hash(Cmi )
p7: assert(HCmi appears once in LH)
p8: SLH ,i = signSki(LH ‖ seed)
Generate Seed
[Wait for N nonces]
c1: Aggregate all nonces in Tseed
c2: MPi ← Merkle proof that noncei is in Tseed
c3: seed← Tseed’s root
Form a Commitment List
c4: SH ← SH ∪ (HCmi , i)
[Wait until done for all parties]
c5: LH ← PrepareList(SH )
Collect Ciphertexts and Signatures
c6: assert(verifySig(Pki, LH ‖ seed, SLH ,i))
c7: j ← get index of participant i in LH
c8: assert(LH [j] = (hash(Cmi ), i))
c9: Ls[j]← SLH ,i
c10: LC [j]← (Cmi , i)
noncei
(seed
,MPi
)
(HCm
i
, i)
LH
(SL
H ,i , Cm
i , i)
Figure 2: Commit Protocol
Algorithm 1 Generate Puzzle
1: function GenPuz(λm, seed)
2: (p, g)← prime and generator from table(λm)
3: jbitnum ← 0
4: bcandidate ← 0
5: while bcandidate /∈ [2, p− 1] do
6: bcandidate ← PRNG(seed, jbitnum, λm)
7: jbitnum ← jbitnum + λm
8: return (p, g, bcandidate)
5.1 Soundness
We prove that an adversary A cannot output a valid Lm with a message that wasn’t committed in the
commit phase.
Lemma 1. For any PPT adversary A playing ΓTime CapsuleSound , the advantage Soundadv[λh,A] is negligible in
λh.
Proof. We calculate the probability that A outputs a valid output with a list Lmo containing a tuple
mlo ∈ {{m
j
i ∈ Lmo|Pj ∈ Pchallenger}}\{{m
1
1, ....,m
k
k}}. Since the output is valid, the function Verify-
Output(seed, SkTL, Ls, Lmo) (algorithm 3) returns true, and specifically in line 14 the verification doesn’t
fail. In this line the verifier checks that challenger’s signatures over the list of commitments and seed are
valid. We denote by LHo the list of commitments that is calculated from the list Lmo by running lines 5-10
in function VerifyOutput(seed, SkTL, Ls, Lmo).
To pass verification, one of the following options must hold:
1. 1 ≤ l ≤ k ∧ Cmo = Cml , The ciphertext of mo equals Pl’s committed ciphertext.
2. 1 ≤ l ≤ k ∧ Cmo 6= Cml ∧ hash(Cmo) = hash(Cml), The ciphertext of mo is different from Pl’s, but
their hashes are the same.
3. LHo 6= LH ∧ (∀1 ≤ j ≤ k : signSkj (LHo ‖ seed) ∈ Ls), the commitments lists are different but the
challenger’s signatures appears in the output’s list of signatures Ls.
Let us start from option 1. ElGamal encryption is an injective function, so if the ciphertexts are equal
and the encryption keys are equal then the messages are equal, though by definition mo 6= mj . If the
encryption keys are different, it means that each key was generated from a different seed value, seedo 6= seed
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Algorithm 2 Coordinator Reveal
1: function Reveal(seed, Ls, Lc)
2: PkTL ← GenPuz(λm, seed)
3: SkTL ← find ElGamal Sk(PkTL)
4: for each (Cm, i) ∈ Lc do
5: m← decSkTL(Cm)
6: Lm ← Lm ‖ (m, i)
7: return (seed, SkTL, Ls, Lm)
Algorithm 3 VerifyOutput
1: function VerifyOutput(λm, seed, SkTL, Ls, Lm)
2: PkTL ← GenPuz(λm, seed)
3: if SkTL is not the solution to puzzle PkTL
4: return FALSE
5: for each j ∈ {1, ..., N} do
6: (m, i)← Lm[j]
7: Cm ← encPkTL(m)
8: LC [j]← (Cm, i)
9: HCm ← hash(Cm)
10: LH [j]← (HCm , i)
11: for each j ∈ {1, ..., N} do
12: (Cm, i)← LC [j]
13: Pki ← get party pk(i)
14: if not verifySig(Pki, LH ‖ seed, Ls[j])
15: return FALSE
16: return TRUE
(Algorithm 3 line 2). In VerifyOutput(·) line 14 the signature over LH ‖ seed is verified so in order
to pass this check using a different seed A has to forge the signature over LHo ‖ seedo, which she can do
with probability εsig forgery. The probability of option 2 is the probability to find a hash collision, which is
εhash collision. Finally, for option 3 the adversary has to create signatures on a new list of commitments LHo ,
that is, accomplish signature forgery given a polynomial computation limitation; the probability for that is
at most εsig forgery.
In summary, the probability thatA can outputmlo in a valid output is Pr[W
Time Capsule
Sound ] ≤ εhash collision+
2 · εsig forgery, which is negligible in λh. Thus, Time Capsule provides Soundness.
5.2 Frontrunning
Next, we prove that Time Capsule is FR-resistant. The FR attack is formalized using two games. We first
show that Time Capsule is secure against Frontrunning Order Choosing (FOC).
Lemma 2. For any PPT adversary A playing ΓTime CapsuleFOC , the advantage FOCadv[λm, λh,A] is negligible
in λh.
Proof. We denote by Lfinal the tuple of transactions the attacker outputs and
by Lwin = {(valid L|{{mi0 appears in L before mA} or {mA appears in L before m
i
1}}
and {mi0 and m
i
1 do not appear together})} the set of winning lists. We calculate the probability
that A outputs Lfinal ∈ Lwin. We can separate the calculation of the probability to win to two different
paths. The first is that A created LH (Figure 2 line 5) that is already organized in a winning order; we
denote this event by ELwin
H
. The second option is that A created LH that is not a winner, we denote this
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Algorithm 4 find ElGamal Sk na¨ıve implementation
1: function SolveDL(p, g, b)
2: for each i in [1, p-1] do
3: if gi mod p = b
4: return i
event by ELlose
H
, but still won the game.
Pr[W ] = Pr[ELwin
H
] + Pr[ELlose
H
] · Pr[Lfinal ∈ Lwin|ELlose
H
] (1)
We begin by calculating Pr[ELwin
H
]. When A chooses the order of LH , she only knows the value of the
hash hash(Cmb) and doesn’t know the values Cmb and mb. Since Cmb is the encryption of mb‖r and r
is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}λh, the probability to find the pre-image of the hash function
is εpre-image. If Pr[ELwin
H
] > 12 is means that A has information about the message mb at this stage. If
she has information with probability larger than εpre-image then she can also find the pre-image of the hash
function with probability larger than εpre-image, violating the pre-image resistance assumption. So
1
2
≤ Pr[ELwin
H
] ≤
1
2
+ εpre-image (2)
and therefore,
Pr[ELlose
H
] = 1− Pr[ELwin
H
] ≤
1
2
. (3)
In the event ELlose
H
A can still output Lfinal ∈ Lwin. In order to do so, the output must be valid according
to the function VerifyOutput(seed, SkTL, Ls, Lm). This function returns false if the challenger’s signature
over (LH ‖ seed) is not valid (algorithm 3 line 14). If the calculated list LH is different from the output then
A can try to forge the challenger’s signature with probability εsig forgery. Meaning,
Pr[Lfinal ∈ Lwin|ELlose
H
] ≤ εsig forgery. (4)
By plugging inequalities 2, 3 and 4 into equation 1, we bound the total probability to win game
ΓTime CapsuleFOC ,
Pr[WTime CapsuleFOC ] ≤
1
2
+ εpre image +
1
2
· εsig forgery.
Thus, Pr[WTime CapsuleFOC ] is negligibly larger than
1
2 and FOCadv[λm, λh,A] is negligible in λh.
Time Capsule is also secure against Frontrunning Message Choosing (FMC), the proof of FMC is similar
to the proof for FOC attack.
Lemma 3. For any PPT adversary A playing ΓTime CapsuleFMC , the value FMCadv[λm, λh,A] is negligible in
λh.
In summary, following directly from lemmas 2 and 3:
Corollary 1. Time Capsule provides FR-resistance.
5.3 Time-Lock
To show that Time Capsule provides Time-Lock, we first prove that each puzzle generated by Time Capsule
is as hard as a DL puzzle (§5.3.1). Then we prove that using multiple different seeds for the puzzle creation
does not give more than a negligible advantage in solving the puzzle (§5.3.2). And finally, we conclude that
Time Capsule provides Time-Lock (§5.3.3).
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5.3.1 Puzzle Hardness
We first prove that a single puzzle generated by GenPuz(λm, seed) is as hard as a random DL puzzle, except
for a negligible probability.
To do this formally we first introduce some notation. P(λm) is the set of all safe primes of size λm
bits; G(p) is the set of all generators of Z∗p and B(p) is the set of all members of Z
∗
p : ([a, b] is the range of
integers from a to b, inclusive). We define the following game ΓTime CapsuleDLGenPuz of an adversary trying to solve
our generated puzzle:
• The challenger chooses seed
R
←− {0, 1}λh.
• The challenger computes (p, g, b)← GenPuz(λm, seed) and gives it to the adversary.
• The adversary outputs a ∈ Z∗p .
Let WGenPuz be the event that b = g
a mod p in ΓTime CapsuleDLGenPuz . Let WDL be the event that the adversary
succeeds to solve a DL puzzle with the same p and g and a random b. We show that a PPT adversary A
has negligible advantage in winning ΓTime CapsuleDLGenPuz compared to a random DL puzzle. Therefore we define
the adversary’s advantage in the game as
DLGenPuzadv(A, λm) , |Pr[WGenPuz]− Pr[WDL]| .
Lemma 4. Let λm be a security parameter. For any PPT adversary A, the advantage DLGenPuzadv(A, λm)
is negligible in λh.
We first show the following claim:
Claim 1. GenPuz(λm, seed) is a pseudo random generator (PRG).
GenPuz(λm, seed) has two logical elements. One element takes the random seed value and expands it
to a longer pseudo random stream using a PRNG. The second element takes the expanded pseudo random
stream and uses it to produce a pseudo random b.
Since we assume that the PRNG is secure for a polynomial length output, it remains to prove that a
polynomial length pseudo random bit stream is sufficient.
The function GenPuz(λm, seed) returns deterministic values for p and g per λm. The value of b is
chosen using iteration sampling from the PRNG output, trying the next λm bits in each iteration. The value
of b must be in the range [2, p − 1] and p is λm bits long with the most significant bit set to one, so the
probability to get a number in the correct range in each iteration is more than 1/2. Thus, the probability
that GenPuz(·) would need k iterations drops exponentially with k and a polynomial length output of
PRNG will be sufficient for the generation of b.
The PRG GenPuz(λm, seed) inherits its advantage from the underlying PRNG and has advantage
εPRNG.
Having shown that GenPuz(λm, seed) provides a pseudo random b, it follows that when we use this
parameter as a part of a DL puzzle, the puzzle is almost as hard as one from truly a random source.
We defer the details of Lemma 4’s proof to Appendix B.
5.3.2 Multiple Seed Advantage
A coordinator can create many different seed values by changing a nonce (if she is also a participant) or
by changing the order of nonces in the Merkle tree (Figure 2 line c1). If she has a set of preferred puzzles
that she can solve efficiently, she can try to receive them through generation of different seed values. We
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prove that a PPT adversarial coordinator using Time Capsule cannot gain an advantage compared to the
DL problem from generating a polynomial number of seeds, except with a negligible probability.
We formalize this requirement with the game ΓTime CapsuleDLMulti-Seed :
• The challenger chooses a polynomial set of random seeds {s1, ..., sk|si
R
←− {0, 1}λh} and sends them to
the adversary.
• The adversary outputs value a.
We say that the adversary wins the ΓTime CapsuleDLMulti-Seed game if she outputs a such that ∃i : bi =
gai mod pi, (pi, gi, bi) ← GenPuz(λm, si). We denote this event by WDLMulti−Seed. The adversary’s ad-
vantage in the game is
DLMulti-Seedadv[λm,A] , |Pr[WDLMulti-Seed]− Pr[WDL]| .
Lemma 5. For any PPT adversary A playing the ΓTime CapsuleDLMulti-Seed game the quantity DLMulti-Seedadv[λm,A]
is negligible in λm.
Proof. The number of possible puzzles per λm is the size of the group B(p) that b is chosen from. The
minimal number is |B(p)| = pmin − 2 = 2
λm−1 − 2. The probability to generate a specific puzzle is 12λm−1−2 .
Under the assumption that A can store a polynomial number in λm of computations, the probability to
generate a puzzle that A has in her memory is smaller than k · poly(λm)2λm−1−2 , which we denote εmulti-seed. This
probability is negligible in λm.
We proved that the advantage that A has in solving a puzzle generated by GenPuz(·) function is εPRNG.
The total advantage DLMulti-Seedadv[λm,A] is the probability to generate a pre-computed stored puzzle
and if this strategy fails, to solve the puzzle, taking into account the PRG advantage. Since we assume
that A does not have advantage in parallel computation of many puzzles over a computation of a single
puzzle (Assumption 1), her advantage is DLMulti-Seedadv[λm,A] ≤ εmulti-seed + εPRNG, which is negligible
in λm.
5.3.3 Timed reveal
Lemma 6. Time Capsule provides Time-Lock.
Proof. Lemma 5 shows that a PPT adversary has only a negligible advantage solving the puzzle in Time
Capsule compared to solving a single DL puzzle, given a random seed value.
The seed value in Time Capsule is pseudo random since each participant gives a random nonce and the
coordinator gathers all nonces to a Merkle tree structure to generate a seed for GenPuz(λm, seed). Given
that at least one participant is following the protocol, her nonce is truly random (Figure 2 line p1) and she
verifies that this nonce is a part of the seed (Figure 2 line p2). Thus and due to the Merkle tree properties,
the generated seed is pseudo random.
The requirement that τ is the mean time it takes to solve a DL puzzle defines the value of λm. A
coordinator can begin to solve the puzzle once she has the seed value (line c3), and starting from this
moment it will take her a mean value of τ to solve the puzzle. Hence, Time Capsule respects definition 3
and provides Time-Lock.
Note that in the the proof for Time-Lock we haven’t used the number of participants N , thus
Corollary 2. Time Capsule’s mean reveal time τ is independent of the participant count N .
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Practical reveal time The DL problem is an active research area [4, 38, 64, 58, 37], so we are unable
to calculate the reveal time distribution. There are many known algorithms, each algorithm has a different
CDF of the time it takes to solve it. In practice, Index calculus [58] and Number Field Sieve [37] have a few
precomputation steps, involving some randomness, until finally the discrete logarithm is calculated. So the
time distribution is actually closer to the mean value.
5.4 Ensured Output
We show that the output of a coordinator that is following the protocol is valid and then that the mean time
it takes her to calculate the output is τ .
Lemma 7. The output of a coordinator following the protocol Time Capsule is valid.
Proof. We will go over the lines of VerifyOutput(·) (Algorithm 3) and check where the validation of the
output can fail. In line 2 the function calculates the value Pk using GenPuz(λm, seed), this is done exactly
as the coordinator does it in the commit protocol (Figure 2 line c3). In line 3 the DL puzzle solution SkTL
is validated. Since the coordinator solves the puzzle correctly (Algorithm 2 line 3), the solution is valid.
Then the function goes over the list Lm, it encrypts every message m in the list and creates a list LC of
tuples (Cm, i) ordered in the same order as Lm. In the reveal phase, the coordinator does the exact opposite
calculation from the list LC to the list Lm (Algorithm 2 lines 4-6). Therefore the list LC is the same in the
verification and in the reveal phase.
The function calculates the hash HCm of the ciphertext Cm and generates a list LH of tuples (HCm , i)
ordered in the same order as Lm (Algorithm 3 lines 9-10). In the commit phase, the coordinator verifies
that Pi had sent Cm that is a pre-image of HCm (Figure 2 line c8), so the list LH is the same in the
verification and in the commit phase.
Once it has the list LH , it verifies that each signature in Ls[j] is valid as a signature of the participant
that committed the message in slot j of the list over the content LH ‖ seed. The coordinator also verifies
that this signature is valid in the commit phase (Figure 2 line 6). Therefore, this check must pass.
We proved that if the coordinator follows the protocol then the output is valid.
Lemma 8. The mean time it takes for a coordinator following the protocol Time Capsule to calculate the
output is τ .
Proof. A coordinator following the protocol generates the puzzle using GenPuz(λm, seed) (Figure 2 algo-
rithm 1). Due to lemma 5, the puzzle is as hard as a DL puzzle, except for a negligible advantage. Since λm
value is set to determine that solving the puzzle takes mean value τ then this is the time the it takes for the
coordinator to solve the puzzle and calculate the output.
Corollary 3. Time Capsule provides Ensured Output.
The proof follows directly from lemma 8 and lemma 7.
5.5 Time Capsule Correctness
In summary, following from lemma 1, corollary 1, lemma 6 and corollary 3:
Theorem 1. Time Capsule algorithm solves MPTC.
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6 Precomputation Resistant DL
The time it takes to reveal the commitments with Time Capsule is the time it takes to compute a DL puzzle
solution. The mean time to reveal the commitments depends on which algorithm is used for solving DL.
Progress in DL analysis [4] has shown that precomputation can reduce solution time. This does not violate
the correctness of Time Capsule, since the difficulty can be increased to reach the desired τ . However, an
accurate choice of λm requires knowing whether the adversary has performed precomputation.
We note, however, that in all algorithms we are aware of, including state of the art solutions like Index
Calculus [3] and Number Field Sieve [4], precomputation is only effective for a specific group and a specific
generator.
If this is the case in general, we can prevent precomputation by selecting both the group G and the
generator g randomly when generating a puzzle. We make the assumption formal (Section 6.1), describe the
PCRGenPuz implementation (Section 6.2) and prove that it is precomputation-resistant (Section 6.3).
6.1 PCR-DL Model
A PCR-DL generator is a function GenPuz. This function takes as input a security parameter λm and a
random value seed and produces as output a DL puzzle (p, g, b).
We assume that precomputation of discrete logarithm is possible for a specific cyclic group Z∗p and a
generator g. We call this information a hint. More formally,
Definition 6 (Precomputation Storage). A PPT adversary with memory M can store hints that can accel-
erate the computation of up to a polynomial number in λm of puzzles.
This assumption is conservative compared to the memory consumption required by Number Field Sieve,
which is super polynomial in λm per hint [4].
We use the empirical assumption [90] that the number of safe primes in interval x is 2C2
x
log2(x)
, where
C2 ≈ 0.66 is the twin prime constant .
We require Precomputation-Resistance. A coordinator using precomputation techniques to store hints in
her memory does not have advantage over a coordinator that doesn’t have memory to store hints. We define
this requirement with the following precomputation-resistance game ΓGenPuzPC .
• The challenger chooses a polynomial set of seeds {s1, ..., sk|si
R
←− {0, 1}λh} and sends them to the
adversary.
• The adversary outputs a ∈ Z∗P .
We say that the adversary solves the puzzle if she outputs a such that ∃i : bi = gai mod pi, (pi, gi, bi) ←
GenPuz(λm, si). We denote by WM the probability of an adversary with memory M and unbounded time
for precomputations to solve the puzzle. We denote by W optMreset the probability of an adversary using the
best algorithm with memory M that is reset at the beginning of the game to solve the puzzle. We define the
advantage in this game by PCadv[λm,A] = |Pr[WM]− Pr[W
opt
Mreset]|.
Definition 7 (DL-PC Resistance). Let λm be a security parameter. The DL puzzle generated by puz ←
GenPuz(λm, seed) is a PCR-DL puzzle if for any PPT adversary A with memory M polynomial in λm, the
advantage PCadv[λm,A] is negligible in λm.
6.2 PCRGenPuz Implementation
We implement the function PCRGenPuz(λm, seed) (algorithm 5). This function takes as input the secu-
rity parameter λm and a randomness seed and outputs the three pseudo random parameters (p, g, b) that
represents the discrete logarithm puzzle.
15
Algorithm 5 Generate PCR-DL Puzzle
1: function PCRGenPuz(λm, seed)
2: jbitnum ← 0
3: pcandidate ← 0
4: while (not primality test(pcandidate)) or (not primality test(
pcandidate−1
2 )) do
5: pcandidate ← 2λm−1 + PRNG(seed, jbitnum, λm − 1)
6: jbitnum ← jbitnum + λm − 1
7: gcandidate ← 0
8: while not is group generator(pcandidate, gcandidate) do
9: gcandidate ← PRNG(seed, jbitnum, λm)
10: jbitnum ← jbitnum + λm
11: bcandidate ← 0
12: while bcandidate /∈ [2, p− 1] do
13: bcandidate ← PRNG(seed, jbitnumt, λm)
14: jbitnum ← jbitnum + λm
15: return (pcandidate, gcandidate, bcandidate)
As in GenPuz(λm, seed), the function initially expands the seed to a longer pseudo random bit stream
with a pseudo random number generator (PRNG). But unlike GenPuz(·), it chooses all three parameters
(p, g, b) using the pseudo random bit stream.
First (lines 3-6), it chooses the prime number p. It constructs a λm bit prime candidate, pcandidate by
setting the most significant bit to 1 and the other λm−1 bits to the first λm−1 bits from the pseudo random
bit stream. It checks if pcandidate is a safe prime with the probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality test [83] over
two numbers, pcandidate and
pcandidate−1
2 . If the candidate is not a safe prime, it constructs a new candidate
from the next λm − 1 pseudo random bits. It iterates until a it finds a safe prime.
Next, it searches for a generator of the group Z∗P (lines 7-10). It constructs a candidate gcandidate from the
next bits in the pseudo random bit stream and checks whether it is a generator using the standard algorithm
for finding a generator in a cyclic group [61]. It does this iteratively until it finds a generator. Finally, it
chooses the public key b in a similar way from the group Z∗P (lines 11-14). The function returns the three
chosen parameters PkTL ← (p, g, b).
6.3 PCRGenPuz Security
Similarly to GenPuz(λm, seed), we first prove that PCRGenPuz(λm, seed) is a PRG. It is easy to see that
iteration sampling provides a uniform choice for (p, g, b) in their respective sets (cf. Appendix A). It remains
to show that a polynomial pseudo random stream is sufficient in order to select p and g.
Lemma 9. The probability that the length of pseudo-random stream needed to generate a safe prime is more
than polynomial in λm is negligible.
We use the empirical assumption defining the number of safe primes in an interval x to prove lemma 9.
For the mathematical details see the full proof in Appendix C.
Since p is a safe prime, the number of generators of group Z∗p is roughly
p
2 . Thus, it is trivial that finding
a valid g also requires a polynomial number of iterations. Therefore, PCRGenPuz is a PRG:
Lemma 10. PCRGenPuz(λm, seed) is a pseudo random generator (PRG) choosing three parameters, each
one is pseudo random and chosen from its set of options, p ∈ P(λm), g ∈ G(p) and b ∈ Z∗p .
Proof. The PRNG with advantage εPRNG provides enough pseudo random bits so that p is chosen uni-
formly at random from P(λm) (Lemma 9) and g and b are chosen uniformly at random from G(p) and Z∗p .
We calculate the advantage of PCRGenPuz(·) over a random choice. We define two games: In game
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0, the challenger computes p
R
←− P(λm), g
R
←− G(p), b
R
←− Z∗p . In game 1, the challenger computes
s
R
←− {0, 1}λh, (p, g, b) ← PCRGenPuz(s, λm). The challenger in both games sends (p, g, b) to the ad-
versary and the adversary outputs one bit. We denote the event that the adversary outputs 1 in game t
byWt. If the adversary has an algorithm that outputs 1 with probability difference larger than εPRNG, then
it would contradict that the PRNG has advantage εPRNG. Thus,
PCRGenPuzadv[λm,A] , |Pr[W1]− Pr[W0]| < εPRNG.
The advantage is negligible and thus PCRGenPuz(·) is a PRG.
We are now ready to prove the security of PCRGenPuz(·).
Theorem 2. The PCRGenPuz is DL-PC resistant.
Proof. Due to Lemma 10, PCRGenPuz(·) is a PRG with advantage εPRNG and due to Lemma 5,GenPuz(·)
generates a puzzle, which has at most a negligible advantage over a random DL puzzle. Under the assumption
that precomputation of DL is possible for a specific p and g, PCRGenPuz(·) puzzle is at least as hard as
GenPuz(·) puzzle, since it chooses pseudo random p and g per puzzle.
By Assumption, A can perform a precomputation per group and generator and the number of hints that
A can store is poly(λm).
The number of possible groups is the number of safe primes in interval [2λm−1, 2λm−1], namely |P(λm)| ≈
C2
2λm
λm
2 , (11). Each group has approximately |G(2λm)| =
2λm
2 generators. We denote the fact that a puzzle
puz has a hint in M by puz ∈M . The probability of the adversary to generate such a puzzle is
Pr[PCRGenPuz(λm, seed) ∈M ] ≈
|hints in M |
|P(λm)| × |G(2λm)|
=
poly(λm)
C2
(
2λm
λm
2
)(
2λm
2
) = 2λm2poly(λm)
C222λm
,
which is negligible in λm. If A generates a polynomial number of puzzles k, then the probability that any of
them is precomputed is bounded by Pr[PCRGenPuz(λm, seed) ∈M ] multiplied by a polynomial, which is
negligible. We denote this probability by εpc.
An adversary playing ΓPCRGenPuzPC with a memory that is reset when the game begins has probability
Pr[W optMreset] to solve one of the k puzzles. An adversary playing with a memory available for precomputations
can use the same strategies that an adversary with memory Mreset can use and in addition she can also
use her memory to accelerate computations with probability εpc. In summary, her probability to solve the
puzzle is Pr[WM ] ≤ Pr[W
opt
Mreset] + εpc.
Thus, the advantage is bounded, PCadv[λm,A] ≤ εpc, where εpc is negligible in λm, so PCRGenPuz is a
PCR-DL.
7 Capsule Chain
A specific scenario where frontrunning-resistance is crucial is blockchain smart contracts. In blockchains
such as Ethereum [34], Bitcoin [75], Libra [14] and Tezos [55], users submit transactions to a shared public
log. The transactions can be simple monetary transfers or steps in elaborate so-called smart contracts. The
order of transactions determines their outcome. One example is a smart contract implementing an exchange
[56, 95, 13, 85, 48], where Alice publishes a $10 buy order and Carol publishes a $7 sell order for some
token. If Bob is able to frontrun and set the order of transactions, he can buy the token from carol, sell it
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to Alice and earn $3. Frontrunning bots with optimized network delays are widely deployed [39], exploiting
knowledge of future trades to frontrun.
Most prominent blockchains [75, 34, 69, 74, 35] achieve censorship-resistance with PoW [43, 57]. But
regardless of their censorship-resistance, PoW blockchains are particularly susceptible to frontrunning: user
transactions are published over a peer-to-peer network, allowing anyone to see all transactions and potentially
inject her own to gain an advantage. Each transaction carries a fee as incentive for the miner who places it
in a block. Frontrunning is therefore as simple as offering a higher fee for an injected transaction. Moreover,
miners are able to arbitrarily add or remove transactions when they compose a new block.
Our goal is therefore to design a PoW alternative that prevents frontrunning until the work is complete.
We focus on a block generation model (§7.1) since other design choices [75, 34, 77, 11, 91], such as graph
structure, are orthogonal. Beyond frontrunning-resistance, the protocol should also maintain PoW proper-
ties, mainly allow for difficulty tuning and prevent an attacker from cheaply generating a series of blocks or
multiple blocks with the same parents.
We present the Capsule-Chain protocol (§7.2) that achieves these properties. It uses the Time-Capsule
approach to achieve frontrunning-resistance. It uses PCRGenPuz to ensure miners have no advantage from
precomputation, maintaining the openness of standard PoW. In Capsule Chain, the PoW is bound to the
location of the block in the block graph and the content of the block, so the same work cannot be used
to produce multiple blocks. Hence, Capsule Chain uses the hash pointers of the parents and hashes of the
transactions to produce the puzzle. This is different from Time Capsule that uses arbitrary nonces. We
prove (§7.3) that in Capsule Chain the amount of computation needed to create blocks is linear in the
number of blocks and that Capsule Chain provides Soundness, FR-resistance and Time-Lock as in Time
Capsule and Precomputation-resistance as in PCRGenPuz.
We overview important elements outside the single-block generation model (§7.4). Unlike most
blockchains, in Capsule Chain users send transactions directly to a specific miner and do not spread them
across the network; the miner does not check transactions for validity in advance, since they are encrypted
during the block creation process. For the same reason, Capsule Chain does not provide Ensured Output
and we discuss how the miner can cope. Finally we discuss user’s dilemma if her transaction is not placed
in a block, as she has no guarantees it was not revealed.
7.1 Capsule Chain Model
Analogically to the MPTC model, the participants are now called users and the coordinator is called a
miner. But unlike MPTC, none of the parties are trusted to follow the protocol. In addition to the user’s
messages, called transactions in this context, the miner places in each block a reference to the previous
block/s, denoted metadata.
We are looking for a createBlock protocol and a verifyBlock function. createBlock takes as
input the metadata and outputs a new block containing a list of the transactions and the metadata and a
proof of its validity. Anyone can verify that a block is valid using verifyBlock. The function takes as
input a block and returns TRUE if and only if the metadata, the transactions and their order match the
metadata, the transactions and their order as committed by the users that participated in createBlock.
Blockchain protocols serve as their own PKIs [75, 34], where each user’s ID is represented on the blockchain
by a public key. Thus, we assume a PKI despite the openness of the system.
The requirement from a solution are (1) Soundness, (2) FR-Resistance and (3) Time-Lock as defined for
MPTC; (4) PC Resistance, as in PCR-DL; and a new requirement (5) Linearity of Computation, which we
define as follows.
The amount of computation required to create k blocks should be linear in k. We formalize the require-
ment with the ΓCapsule ChainLinear game, parametrized by a positive integer k polynomial in λm.
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Algorithm 6 Miner Build Block
1: function CreateBlock(metadata)
2: (seed, Tseed, PkTL, Lc, Ls, Lseed)← run commit protocol (Appendix D).
3: (seed, SkTL, Ls, Lm)← Reveal(PkTL, Ls, Lc) /*solve puzzle*/
4: return (metadata, SkTL, Ls, Lseed, Lm)
• The adversary expends computation power equivalent to solving k DL puzzles, in expectation.
• The adversary returns Capsule-Chain’s blocks.
The adversary wins the ΓCapsule ChainLinear game if she returns k + 1 different valid blocks. We denote the event
that the adversary wins by WCapsule ChainLinear . We define the advantage in this game by Linearadv[λm, k,A] ,
Pr[WCapsule ChainLinear ]
Definition 8. A PoW system provides Linearity of Computation if for every k, polynomial in λm, and for
any PPT adversary A playing ΓCapsule ChainLinear , the advantage Linearadv[λm, k,A] is negligible in λm.
This requirement implies that the content of the block is binding for both the transactions and the
metadata since the miner cannot create two different blocks without solving two different puzzles.
7.2 Capsule Chain Protocol
The commit protocol of Capsule Chain (Appendix D) is similar to that of Time Capsule (Figure 2) with
the following differences: 1. The first element of the Merkle tree (Figure 2 line c1) is the hash of metadata.
2. There is an additional output parameter, a list of the order of user’s nonces in the Merkle tree. 3. The
commit protocol uses PCRGenPuz(·) instead of GenPuz(·) (Figure 2 line c3) to generate a precomputation-
resistant puzzle. 4. In the first step, each user calculates nonce ← hash(mi) instead of a random nonce
(Figure 2 line c1).
In Time Capsule, the problem becomes irrelevant if all parties are malicious, since the result doesn’t
affect any external party. In contrast, in Capsule Chain, a malicious party or colluding parties that create
a block can affect other parties by violating the blockchain properties. In Time-Capsule’s commit protocol
every participant sends a random nonce and the coordinator generates a pseudo random seed using a Merkle
tree (Figure 2 line 1), the seed is pseudo random since at least one nonce is truly random. This is essential
for the proof that solving the puzzle generated from seed has negligible advantage compared to a random
puzzle. In Capsule Chain, no party is trusted, so none of the nonces is necessarily random. The source of
trusted randomness here is hash(metadata).
A miner creating a new block first runs the routine createBlock(metadata) (Algorithm 6) with the
metadata that she chooses. This routine first runs the commit protocol, as described above. Then, the miner
runs the reveal function (Algorithm 2), which is similar to the Time-Capsule reveal function. In addition to
the content required for the output of Time Capsule, the block also contains metadata and a list Lseed of
users’ indices ordered by the same order as their nonces in the merkle tree (Algorithm 6 line 4).
Anyone can verify the validity of the block using the function VerifyBlock (Algorithm 7). The function
re-generates seed by aggregating the hashes of the metadata and the hashes of the messages in a merkle tree
according to Lseed, i.e., in the same order that the tree was generated in the commit protocol. Using this
seed, it verifies the output using VerifyOutput as in Time Capsule (algorithm 3).
7.3 Capsule Chain Correctness
Both the Soundness and FR Resistance proofs for Time Capsule (§5.1 and §5.2) apply for Capsule Chain.
The proofs refer to the commit protocol stages after the seed creation. Since the differences in the commit
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Algorithm 7 Verify Block
1: function VerifyBlock(metadata, SkTL, Ls, Lseed, Lm)
2: Initiate a Merkle tree Tseed
3: Insert hash(metadata) to Tseed
4: for each (m, i) ∈ Lm do
5: j ← get index of user i in Lseed
6: Insert hash(m) to leaf number j in Tseed
7: seed← Tseed’s root
8: if not VerifyOutput(seed, SkTL, Ls, Lm) (algorithm 3) return FALSE
9: return TRUE
protocol are only in the seed creation, they do not affect these proofs. We proceed to overview the rest of
the properties.
7.3.1 Time-Lock
Capsule Chain provides Time-Lock.
The proof is similar to the proof for Time Capsule (§5.3) except for the argument for seed pseudoran-
domness, since other than the seed creation, the commit protocol is the same for both.
The source of trusted randomness in Capsule Chain is a hash of the state of the current block graph
(metdata). A PPT adversary can try to run a brute force search on a block in order to get a desired
hash(metadata), but her chances to succeed are negligible in λh, due to the pre-image resistance of the hash.
7.3.2 PC Resistance
We proved (Theorem 2) that the puzzle generated by PCRGenPuz(·), which Capsule Chain uses, is PC-
resistant. The difference in Capsule Chain is that the seed that is used as input for PCRGenPuz(·) is pseudo
random and not random as in the proof of Theorem 2. A pseudo random seed input to a PRG function gives
a negligible advantage over a random seed input to this function, due to the PRG guarantees (Appendix B).
Other than the seed, the proof is the same as the proof for PCRGenPuz. Thus, Capsule Chain provides PC
resistance.
7.3.3 Linearity of Computation
We prove that the puzzle computation effort is linear in the number of puzzles.
Lemma 11. For every PPT adversary A playing ΓCapsule ChainLinear , and for every value k, polynomial in λm,
the advantage Linearadv[k,A] is negligible in λm.
Proof. If A publishes k+1 blocks, it means she has puzzle solutions for k+1 blocks. Due to the PC-resistance
property of the puzzle, A has a negligible advantage εpc to use a common precomputation of different puzzles.
There is only one other way to solve k puzzles and create k+1 blocks, to have at least two identical puzzles
in the set of k + 1 puzzles.
Consider two blocks, B and B′. Block B contains l messages and metadata; we denote the i’th message
of block B by mi. Similarly, block B
′ contains l′ messages and metadata’ ; m′i is message number i in B
′.
We denote by puz and puz’ the puzzles generated from block contents B and B′, respectively.
There can be two sources for block differences, different metadata or different committed messages. Let
us find the probability for the adversary to generate two different blocks B and B′ with the same puzzle
puz = puz’.
For this to happen, one the following must occur:
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1. The lists of messages are of the same length l = l′ and at least one message is different (∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ l
such that mi 6= m
′
i) or the metadata is different (metadata 6= metadata
′), but their hashes are the same
(hash(metadata) = hash(metadata’) and ∀i, hash(mi) = hash(m′i));
2. at least one node of the Merkle tree is different (including the case l 6= l′) but the Merkle root is the
same for both blocks; or
3. the blocks’ seed values are different but PCRGenPuz produces the same puzzle.
The probability for (1) is εhash collision and the probability for (2) is εMT collision.
It remains to calculate the probability of (3), which we denote εPCRGenPuz collision. The number of
possible puzzles per λm is C22
λm ·
(
2λm
λm
2
)
·
(
2λm
2
)
(Equation 11). So the probability to generate a puzzle
puz from seed is roughly the probability to choose a puzzle uniformly at random from the set of puzzles,
(C22
3λm
2λm2
)−1, thus the probability εPCRGenPuz collision is negligible in λm.
The total probability that block contents B and B′ would produce the same puzzle is less
than εhash collision + εMT collision + εPCRGenPuz collision. Both εMT collision and εhash collision are negligible
in λh and εPCRGenPuz collision is negligible in λm. Thus the probability to obtain two blocks B and B
′ such
that puz’ = puz is negligible in λm. The advantage in the game is the probability to use common precom-
putations or to get an identical puzzle for two different blocks, multiplied by the number of possible block
pairs in k+ 1 puzzles, Linearadv[k,A] ≤ εpc +
k2
2 · Pr[puz = puz
′|B 6= B′]. Since k is polynomial in λm, the
probability is negligible in λm. Therefore, Capsule Chain provides Linearity of Computation.
7.4 Practical Considerations
We review several challenges for Capsule Chain that remain as open questions for future work.
7.4.1 Mining Advatange
Solving the DL problem is a search in a finite set. The mining process in Capsule Chain is therefore not
memoryless as with hash-based mining [75]. Thus, larger miners gain an additional advantage, improving
their chance to find a block beyond the proportion of their computational power. The implication is reduced
motivation for small miners to participate, an issue that should be addressed with mechanism design.
7.4.2 Ensured Output
Capsule Chain does not provide Ensured Output as Time Capsule since the hash that the user sends in the
beginning of the commit protocol must be the same as the hash of the message in the output block in order
for the block to be valid. The miner cannot validate this until she reveals the committed messages, and a
violation by a user implies the loss of a full block’s computation work by the miners. One way to overcome
this is to have each user send a zero-knowledge proof that her commitment matches her nonce before forming
the commitment list (Figure 2). Another is to incentivize users to follow the protocol by external measures,
such as penalizing misbehavior, secured by a collateral, possibly on the blockchain itself. Note that this is
easily enforceable as the miner has irrefutable proof for misbehavior in form of the violating user’s signature
(SLH ,i).
7.4.3 Transaction Fee
As with existing PoW solutions, the miner is incentivized to create non-empty blocks due to transaction fees.
The transaction fee rate would naturally balance to cover the overhead of the interactive commit protocol.
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7.4.4 Aborted Block
In Capsule Chain, many miners compete to create the next block. Once a miner mined a block, she publishes
it and then other miners switch to mine the subsequent block.
Consider a user that completed the commit phase with a miner A, but A did not complete the block
creation while another miner B did. In principle, miner A is supposed to abandon the transaction and start
mining the next block. But the user doesn’t have any guarantee that the miner indeed hasn’t solved the
puzzle before moving on. If the miner had found the puzzle solution, it means that all transactions in that
block are not secret anymore.
The user now has a dilemma. If her intentions remain secret, she might want to post the same transaction
again in the next block; but if her intentions were revealed, she might want to change strategy and place a
different transaction or none at all. The user might suspect that the miner has intentionally rejected this
block despite expending the resources and solving the puzzle. Her decision depends on the application and
is outside the scope of this work.
However, we note that the chances for such a reveal are small. Typically [75, 34, 91], once a block
is published all miners should change the metadata of the block they are generating. Since many miners
compete to create each block, a small miner is not likely to win. A miner that owns 10% of the computation
power in the system would take in expectation roughly another 9 times the block interval to reveal a block.
Thus, the miner in unlikely to quickly reveal the transactions, and would only reject a completed block in
radical situations, i.e., the block’s content will cause her a larger loss than the block’s creation profit.
8 Conclusion
We define MPTC, where multiple parties commit to values that are revealed after a tunable expected time.
It is useful in any situation where frontrunning is unacceptable. We present Time Capsule that solves
MPTC and prove its correctness without relying on trust, incentives or synchrony as previous approaches
to similar problems. We also show how Time Capsule can be extended to prevent precomputation using
assumptions based on existing solutions of the DL problem in Z∗n. In Capsule Chain we adapt Time Capsule to
overcome the frontrunning issue plaguing blockchain systems, resolving a persistent challenge in decentralized
permissionless system design.
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A Iteration Sampling
In this section we prove that a value chosen from a set Z by iteration sampling from a larger set Y is chosen
uniformly at random.
Definition 9. Let Y be a set of values. Let Z be set of values such that Z ∈ Y . We say that x is chosen
from Z by iteration sampling from Y if we iteratively choose a random value r
R
←− Y and check if r ∈ Z. If
it is then v ← r.
Lemma 12. Let Y be a set of values. Let Z be set of values such that Z ∈ Y . A value x chosen from Z by
iteration sampling from Y is chosen uniformly at random.
Proof. The probability to choose a value x ∈ Z at the first iteration is Pr[success] = |Z||Y | and the probability
to choose a value x /∈ Z is Pr[failure] = |Y |−|Z||Y | . The probability to choose x ∈ Z at iteration k is
Pr[success at iteration k] = Pr[failure]k−1 × Pr[success]. The probability to choose a specific x value is
Pr[x] =
∞∑
k=1
(Pr[success at iteration k]×
Pr[x|success at iteration k])
=
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
∞∑
k=1
(
|Y | − |Z|
|Y |
)k−1
×
|Z|
|Y |
×
1
|Z|
=
1
|Z|
. (5)
This result indicates that x is chosen uniformaly at random from the set Z.
B Puzzle Hardness Proof
We prove Lemma 4, given the GenPuz(·) is a PRG as shown in Claim 1.
Proof. We prove that if A had a non-negligible advantage in the game, then a PRG adversary could have
used A’s output in order to distinguish between a PRG output and a truly random value.
Recall that PRG security is defined using two games [30]. Let G be a PRG. In Game 0, B gets as input
a truly random b, in Game 1, B gets as input b such that s
R
←− {0, 1}λh, b ← G(s). B outputs 1 in Game 0
with probability Pr[WPRG,0] and in Game 1 with probability Pr[WPRG,1].
According to PRG security definition, for every PPT adversary B, the advantage is
PRGadv[B,G] = |Pr[WPRG,1]− Pr[WPRG,0]| < εPRG (6)
Figure 3 illustrates the following scenario. Let A be a PPT adversary that attacks the DL problem. Let
B be a PPT adversary that attacks PRG (in our case the PRG is GenPuz(·)). We define B to play the role
of the challenger for adversary A. B receives b from the PRG challenger and passes it on to adversary A. A
returns her puzzle solution to B. If A successfully solves the discrete logarithm, then B returns 1, otherwise
she returns 0.
The probability that B outputs 1 in Game 1 is the probabilty that A solves a pseudo ransom puzzle,
Pr[WPRG,1] = Pr[WDLGenPuz ] (7)
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PRG
Challenger
B
Ab
b a
if b = ga mod p
return 1
else
return 0
Figure 3: PRG adversary B
The probability that B outputs 1 in game 0 is that probability that A solves a random puzzle,
Pr[WPRG,0] = Pr[WDL] (8)
Plugging equations (6), (7) and (8) yields
DLGenPuzadv[A, λm] = PRGadv[B,G] < εPRG (9)
and since the PRG advantage of GenPuz(·) is εPRNG, then
DLGenPuzadv[A, λm] < εPRNG (10)
which is negligible in λh.
C Choosing A Safe Prime
In this section we prove Lemma 9.
Proof. PCRGenPuz(·) chooses a safe prime in the range [2λm−1, 2λm − 1]. The number of safe primes in
this range is
|P(λm)| = 2C2
(
2λm
log2(2λm)
−
2λm−1
log2(2λm−1)
)
∼= C2
2λm
λm
2 (11)
The probability to fail to find a safe prime in k guesses is
Pr[k failures] =
(
2λm − |P(λm)|
2λm
)k
.
We show that
∀c ∃N : ∀λm > N : Pr[k failures] <
1
λm
c .
In other words, we are looking for k, such that the probability for k failures is negligible.
Pr[k failures] =
(
2λm − |P(λm)|
2λm
)k
<
1
λm
c . (12)
Equation (11) and (12) give us the required bound on k:
(
1−
C2
λm
2
)k
<
1
λm
c ⇒ k > −
c log(λm)
log(1− C2λm
−2)
. (13)
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Description Capsule Chain Time Capsule
The user creates a nonce by hashing the committed mes-
sage.
p1 p1
The first element in the seed Merkle tree is metadata. c2 -
The miner stores the order of users’ nonces in a list Lseed. c3, c4, c5 -
The parties compute the puzzle using PCRGenPuz. p3 p3
Table 1: Capsule Chain differences from Time Capsule
Based on logarithmic inequalities [93], using the fact that
−C2λm
−2 > −1, ,
we bound the denominator,
log(1 − C2λm
−2) >
−C2λm
−2
1− C2λm
−2 . (14)
We plug (14) into (13) and use simple algebraic operation to simplify the bound on k:
−
c log(λm)
log(1− C2λm
−2)
< −
c log(λm)(1− C2λm
−2)
−C2λm
−2
=
c
C2
log(λm)(λm
2 − C2)
<
c
C2
(λm
3 − C2λm)
λ > c
<
1
C2
(λm
4 − C2λm
2) (15)
From (15) and (12) it follows that
∀k ≥
1
C2
(λm
4 − C2λm
2) : Pr[k failures] <
1
λm
c .
We showed that the probability that we couldn’t find a safe prime after k rounds, for k > 1
C2
(λm
4−C2λm
2)
is negligible. We need λm − 1 pseudo random bits in order to create a safe prime candidate per round.
Meaning, the length of required pseudo random bits is polynomial in λm.
D Capsule Chain Commit Protocol
The difference of Capsule Chain from Time Capsule was described in §7.2. We detail the full Capsule Chain’s
commit protocol in Figure 4, highlighting the differences from Time Capsule’s commit protocol (Figure 2).
In table 1, we describe each difference followed by line number in Capsule Chain’s protocol and by the
matching line number in Time Capsule’s protocol, if exists.
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Pi Coordinator
p1: noncei ← hash(mi)
Encrypt and Commit
p2: assert(verifyMP(seed,MPi,noncei))
p3: PkTL ← PCRGenPuz(λm, seed)
p4: ri
R
←− {0, 1}λh
p5: Cmi ← encPkTL(mi‖ri)
p6: HCmi ← hash(Cmi )
p7: assert(HCmi appears once in LH)
p8: SLH ,i = signSki(LH ‖ seed)
Generate Seed
c1: Initiate Merkle tree Tseed
c2: Insert hash(metadata) to Tseed
[Wait for N nonces]
c3: Sseed ← Susers ∪ i
c4: Lseed ← PrepareList(Sseed)
c5: Aggregate all nonces in Tseed ac-
cording to the order in Lseed
c6: MPi ← Merkle proof that noncei
is in Tseed
c7: seed← Tseed’s root
Form a Commitment List
c8: SH ← SH ∪ (HCmi , i)
[Wait until done for all parties]
c9: LH ← PrepareList(SH )
Collect Ciphertexts and Signatures
c10: assert(verifySig(Pki, LH ‖ seed, SLH ,i))
c11: j ← get index of participant i in LH
c12: assert(LH [j] = (hash(Cmi ), i))
c13: Ls[j]← SLH ,i
c14: LC [j]← (Cmi , i)
(noncei , i)
(seed
,MPi
)
(H
C
m
i
, i)
LH
(SL
H ,i , Cm
i , i)
Figure 4: Capsule Chain Commit Protocol
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